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ABSTRACT
In 1996, Congress created the Alien Terrorist Removal Court
(ATRC). A court of deportation, the ATRC provides the U.S.
attorney general a forum to remove expeditiously any resident alien
who the attorney general has probable cause to believe is a terrorist.
In theory, resident aliens receive different—and arguably far
weaker—procedural protections before the ATRC than they would
receive before an administrative immigration panel. In theory, the
limited nature of the ATRC protections might implicate resident
aliens’ Fifth Amendment rights. In practice, however, the ATRC has
never been used. Perhaps to avoid an adverse constitutional ruling,
the attorney general has never brought a deportation proceeding
before the court. This Note examines the constitutionality of statutes
underlying the ATRC that allow the government to rely on secret
evidence. Although these provisions are constitutional on their face,
they would be unconstitutional as applied in some circumstances. This
Note concludes by suggesting how the ATRC’s secret-evidence
provisions must be amended if the provisions are to become
constitutional as applied in all circumstances.

INTRODUCTION
The United States Code provides for a court that is quite
1
peculiar: the Alien Terrorist Removal Court (ATRC). The court’s

Copyright © 2008 by John Dorsett Niles.
† Candidate for J.D., 2008, Duke University School of Law; candidate for M.A.,
Economics, 2008, Duke University Graduate School. I would like to thank Scott Silliman, Brian
Eyink, Michael Rosenberg, Lauren Tribble, and the staff of the Duke Law Journal for their
many helpful comments.
1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37 (2006).
Although the statute does not refer to the Alien Terrorist Removal Court by this name, this
name has been used widely by numerous authorities. E.g., David A. Martin, Graduated
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purpose is not neutral: it provides a forum for the U.S. attorney
general to deport expeditiously any resident alien who the attorney
2
general has probable cause to believe is a terrorist. Its procedures are
3
secretive: proceedings must begin ex parte and in camera. During the
war on terror, however, the ATRC has never been used despite its
4
emphasis on deporting suspected terrorists.
Tension embroils the ATRC. The United States faces an ongoing
5
threat of domestic terrorism, and one way to reduce that threat is to
6
deport suspicious aliens. The U.S. Constitution, however, constrains
how the government may act to deport a resident alien. Although the
government may seek to deport any resident alien, in doing so its
7
procedures must be fundamentally fair. For example, it must provide
the alien adequate notice of deportation proceedings as well as an
8
opportunity to be heard. When the government does not utilize the

Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 134.
2. See Jennifer A. Beall, Note, Are We Only Burning Witches? The Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693, 708 (1998) (“The
Act allows the government, at a resident alien deportation hearing, to present classified
information in a summary report without revealing the classified evidence to the alien, while
allowing the judge to examine all the evidence.”). Although Senate Democrats and Senate
Republicans introduced competing bills to establish the ATRC’s procedures, they agreed on the
court’s basic purpose. President Clinton, introducing the Democrats’ bill that later died,
summarized this purpose as “[p]rovid[ing] a workable mechanism . . . to deport expeditiously
alien terrorists without risking the disclosure of national security information or techniques.”
141 CONG. REC. 4225 (1995) (statement of William J. Clinton, President of the United States).
A “resident alien” is any person residing in the U.S. who is not an American citizen. BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 79 (8th ed. 2004).
3. 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).
4. Carl Tobias, The Process Due Indefinitely Detained Citizens, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1687, 1723
(2007) (“[T]he 1996 alien terrorist removal system . . . has yet to be invoked.”).
5. See, e.g., Gail Gibson, War on Homegrown Terrorism Proceeding with Quiet Urgency,
BALT. SUN, Apr. 17, 2005, at 1A (“Independent groups that monitor extremist activity inside
the United States say that while the country has focused since 2001 on the threat from foreign
terrorists, domestic operatives . . . have not gone away and, in some ways, are more dangerous
than ever.”). Domestic terrorism refers to activities that “occur primarily within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(c) (Supp. V 2005).
6. See Rachel L. Swarms, Thousands of Arabs and Muslims Could Be Deported, Officials
Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2003, at A1 (“[D]eportations are a striking example of how the Bush
Administration increasingly uses the nation’s immigration system as a weapon in the battle
against terror.”).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law . . . .”).
8. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 36–37 (1982) (holding that a lawful, permanent
resident alien seeking reentry to the United States is entitled to a hearing and remanding to
determine whether eleven hours’ prior notice of the hearing was adequate).
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ATRC, it addresses these constitutional strictures by conducting
administrative hearings to determine deportation. At administrative
hearings, the government must disclose its reasons for seeking
9
deportation. This requirement can be burdensome for the
government; in some situations, disclosing its reasons for seeking
10
Requiring
deportation might compromise national security.
disclosure thus can place two national security goals squarely in
conflict with each other. On the one hand, tolerating the alien’s
continued presence within U.S. borders could compromise national
security; on the other, disclosing the government’s reasons for seeking
11
deportation could compromise national security.
12
Congress created the ATRC to sidestep this conflict. The
ATRC’s statutory framework permits the U.S. attorney general to
deport a suspicious resident alien without disclosing either the
government’s confidential reasons for seeking deportation or any
confidential evidence supporting those reasons, so long as the
presiding judge finds that
the continued presence of the alien in the United States would likely
cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death
or serious bodily injury to any person, and the provision of the
summary would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the
13
national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person.

9. Id. But see D. Mark Jackson, Exposing Secret Evidence: Eliminating a New Hardship of
United States Immigration Policy, 19 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 25, 42 n.83 (citing exceptions to this
general principle).
10. See, e.g., Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1962, 1963
(2005) (“Proponents of secret evidence argue . . . disclosure [of classified information] would
jeopardize intelligence-gathering efforts in the field and dry up valuable sources of
information. . . . Such a scenario is particularly dangerous if the accused is a member of a
worldwide terrorist network, like al Qaeda.”).
11. As Professor Scaperlanda writes,
Without the ability to use classified information as evidence in the deportation of
terrorists, the executive branch is placed on the horns of a most difficult dilemma: it
can disclose the evidence and deport, alienating [allies] in the process,
compromising . . . agents in the field, and possibly compromising . . . intelligence
techniques, or it can refuse to disclose the evidence and knowingly harbor a terrorist.
Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone?: Due Process and Secret Deportation Proceedings,
7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23, 29 (1996).
12. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 401, 110
Stat. 1258 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–37 (2006)).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).
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In other words, whenever national security requires deportation and
secrecy, ATRC procedures allow the government to meet both goals
by permitting the use of secret evidence.
Using secret evidence, however, implicates a resident alien’s
14
Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. Because the
evidence is undisclosed, the alien cannot examine it or test its
accuracy. Also, to the extent the information’s source is secret, the
15
alien cannot confront that source. The alien might not even learn the
nature of the evidence underlying the prosecution; the alien might not
16
know what to defend against or how to do it. Because of these
concerns, several commentators have argued that the ATRC’s secret17
evidence provisions are unconstitutional. Perhaps out of fear about

14. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew
v. Corning, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537,
542 (1950); Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1059 (9th Cir. 1995),
vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 409
(D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir.
2001); Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13, 18 (D.D.C. 1992) (mem.).
15. Even though the ATRC’s allowance of secret evidence restricts an alien’s ability to
confront adverse evidence, the ATRC does not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to
confront one’s accuser because ATRC proceedings are immigration rather than criminal
proceedings. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 1, at 115 (“[Legal permanent residents] are not given
the full array of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in the removal proceeding itself, but they
[do] have such protections in the underlying criminal prosecution.”); cf. Note, supra note 10, at
1973 (“Indeed, the extent to which the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, and the
Constitution’s due process protections more generally, apply to military commission trials is a
hotly contested question.”).
16. During the Senate’s floor debate on the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act, Senator Biden presented a colorful hypothetical to illustrate this concern:
In the administration’s bill, the Government could, in some circumstances, use secret
information, not disclosed to the defendant, not disclosed to the defendant’s lawyers,
in order to make a case.
. . . . [T]he prosecutor [could] meet alone with the judge and say:
“Judge, these are all the horrible things that the defendant did. We’re not going to tell
the defendant what evidence there is that he did these horrible things. We’re not
going to let the defendant know what that evidence is. We’re not going to let the
defendant’s lawyer know what it is. We’re not going to let the defendant’s lawyer
answer these questions. You and me judge”—me, the prosecutor; you, the judge—
“let’s deport him in a secret hearing, using secret evidence. Let’s walk out of this
courtroom, out of your chambers, walk out and say, ‘OK, Smedlap, you’re deported.
We find you’re a terrorist. You’re out of here.’”
And Smedlap looks and says, “Hey, tell me who said I was a terrorist. How do you
know that?” We say, “Oh, no, we can’t tell you. We know you did it, and we can’t tell
you how we know.”
141 CONG. REC. 14531 (1995) (statement of Sen. Biden).
17. See, e.g., David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties
Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247, 331–35 (1996) (arguing
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the ATRC’s constitutionality, the attorney general has never used the
18
court. The constitutionality of its secret-evidence provisions has
19
never been tested. Because of the court’s potential utility as a forum
to safeguard the nation’s security from domestic terrorist acts, striking
a constitutional balance is critical.
This Note examines the constitutionality of the ATRC’s secretevidence provisions. Part I outlines the ATRC’s statutory framework.
It examines the court’s secret-evidence provisions and places them
within the context of the court’s procedures more generally. Part II
shifts attention to case law, exploring how courts have defined the
scope of resident aliens’ Fifth Amendment right to prevent the
government from using secret evidence against them in immigration
proceedings. In light of this case law, Part II examines how past
commentators have assessed the ATRC’s constitutionality. Part III
reassesses the constitutionality of the ATRC’s secret-evidence
provisions. Although the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions are
constitutional on their face, Part III argues that they would fail an asapplied challenge by a lawful, permanent resident alien who lacked
the opportunity to cross-examine adverse evidence either directly or
constructively through a specially appointed attorney. If the ATRC is
to pass constitutional muster as applied in all circumstances, its
statutory framework must be amended in two ways. First, Congress
must strengthen the ATRC procedural protections to provide
unlawful resident aliens and legal, temporary aliens with the same
level of protection that the ATRC provides to permanent resident
20
aliens. Second, the ATRC procedures must provide all resident
aliens with the option to have a special attorney review the
government’s secret evidence on the aliens’ behalf.

that the ATRC’s statutory framework is unconstitutional); Beall, supra note 2, at 708 (same);
Lawrence E. Harkenrider, Comment, Due Process or “Summary” Justice?: The Alien Terrorist
Removal Provisions Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 4 TULSA
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 143, 166–67 (1996) (same). But see Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 29–30
(arguing that the ATRC’s statutory framework is constitutional).
18. See STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 856 (4th ed. 2007) (“It may be
that constitutional doubts about the extraordinary Star Chamber quality of this special court are
why the government has never used it.”).
19. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
20. This is so even though the distinction between a legal permanent resident, a legal
temporary resident, and an illegal resident is constitutionally significant. For a more complete
explanation of this distinction’s constitutional significance, see infra notes 60–62 and
accompanying text.
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I. THE ALIEN TERRORIST REMOVAL COURT’S
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The ATRC came into being in 1996 when Congress passed the
21
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. The congressional
majority that created the ATRC intended this court to protect against
domestic acts of terrorism without unduly interfering with resident
22
aliens’ constitutional rights. To assess whether Congress succeeded,
it is important to become familiar with the statutory provisions
underlying the ATRC. This Part introduces three categories of these
statutory provisions: those providing for the court’s jurisdiction and
composition of judges, those providing for the court’s prehearing
procedures, and those providing for the procedures at ATRC
hearings.
A. Jurisdiction and Composition
By statute, the ATRC possesses jurisdiction to adjudicate
deportation proceedings “[i]n any case in which the Attorney General
23
has classified information that an alien is an alien terrorist.”
Although it is an Article I court, Article III judges govern it—five
U.S. District Court judges, appointed by the Chief Justice of the U.S.
24
Supreme Court. Each judge serves for five years, and no two judges
25
may come from the same judicial circuit.
B. Prehearing Procedures
ATRC cases begin in secret. The U.S. attorney general submits
an ex parte, in camera application identifying the resident alien whom
26
the attorney general seeks to deport. A single ATRC judge reviews
27
the attorney general’s application. In addition to the application, the
judge may consider any “other information, including classified

21. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1258 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1537 (2006)).
22. See 141 CONG. REC. 14524 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Each of the provisions in
the [Alien Terrorist Removal Act, Title IV of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996,] strikes a careful balance between necessary vigilance against a terrorist threat and
the preservation of our cherished freedom.”).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1).
24. Id. § 1532(a).
25. Id. § 1532(a)–(b).
26. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(C).
27. Id. § 1533(c)(1).
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information, presented under oath or affirmation; and testimony
28
received in any hearing on the application.” The judge must grant
the attorney general’s application on a finding of probable cause to
believe that “the alien who is the subject of the application has been
correctly identified and is an alien terrorist present in the United
States; and removal [via administrative proceeding] would pose a risk
29
to the national security of the United States.” None of the
information that the judge considers in granting the attorney
general’s application has evidentiary value unless the attorney general
30
presents the same evidence at the removal hearing.
C. Removal Hearing Procedures
If the attorney general’s application for an ATRC removal
hearing is approved, the alien who is the subject of the hearing must
receive reasonable notice of “the nature of the charges against [him],
including a general account of the basis for the charges; and the time
31
and place at which the hearing will be held.” The hearing must be
32
open to the public, and the individual has a right to be present at the
33
removal hearing and a right to counsel. If the alien cannot afford
34
counsel, the ATRC judge must appoint an attorney.
The removal hearing begins with the government’s case-in35
chief. The government enjoys relatively free reign regarding the
evidence it may present against the resident alien: the Federal Rules
36
of Evidence do not apply, and the alien may not seek to suppress
37
evidence as being unlawfully obtained. Also, the government may
present in camera and ex parte any evidence for which the attorney

28. Id. § 1533(c)(1)(A)–(B).
29. Id. § 1533(c)(2)(A)–(B).
30. See id. § 1534(c)(5) (“The decision of the judge regarding removal shall be based only
on that evidence introduced at the removal hearing.”).
31. Id. § 1534(b)(1)–(2).
32. Id. § 1534(a)(2).
33. Id. § 1534(c)(1).
34. Id.
35. Id. § 1534(f).
36. Id. § 1534(h).
37. Id. § 1534(e)(1)(B). Jennifer Beall writes that the ATRC is unconstitutional because it
allows unlawfully obtained evidence to be considered, and she implies that the ATRC’s
framework should be amended to foreclose such evidence. Beall, supra note 2, at 706–08. A full
discussion of this issue requires more space than is available for this Note. This Note’s scope is
limited to assessing whether the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions are constitutional.
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general unilaterally “determines that public disclosure would pose a
risk to the national security of the United States or to the security of
38
any individual.” When the government presents evidence in secret,
39
the source of the information remains secret as well.
For secret evidence to be admissible, in most situations the
government must provide the ATRC with an unclassified summary of
40
the evidence. Such a summary must be “sufficient to enable the alien
41
to prepare a defense.” In some situations, however, the ATRC judge
may allow the government to enter secret evidence even without
42
providing a summary. Specifically, the government may admit secret
evidence without providing a summary if the ATRC judge finds that
the continued presence of the alien in the United States would likely
cause serious and irreparable harm to the national security or death
or serious bodily injury to any person, and the provision of the
summary would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the
43
national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person.

Although the alien may not personally examine any of the
government’s secret evidence, the alien still may challenge such
evidence. If the alien has received an unclassified summary of the
secret evidence, the alien may challenge the evidence through this
unclassified summary. If the alien has not received an unclassified
summary but is lawfully admitted for permanent U.S. residence, the
court must appoint the alien a special attorney who possesses a
security clearance affording the attorney access to classified
44
information. The lawful, permanent resident alien may then examine
and challenge the veracity of the evidence constructively through the
45
specially appointed attorney. If the alien is not lawfully admitted for
permanent U.S. residence, however, a special attorney is not
available. The illegal or temporary alien’s only option for challenging
secret evidence is to use an unclassified summary of the evidence, if

38. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(A), (f).
39. See id. § 1534(e)(3)(A) (“[N]either the alien nor the public shall be informed of such
evidence or its sources . . . .”).
40. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(B).
41. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(C).
42. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E)(ii).
43. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii).
44. Id. § 1532(e)(1).
45. Id. § 1534(e)(3)(E)(i), (e)(3)(F)(i).
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46

such a summary is available. Any alien may cross-examine nonsecret
47
evidence and nonsecret witnesses.
After the government presents its case-in-chief, the alien may
48
introduce evidence to defend against the charges. The government
49
then has an opportunity to close the hearing by replying in rebuttal.
Ultimately, the government must carry a “burden to prove, by the
preponderance of the evidence, that the alien is subject to removal
50
because the alien is an alien terrorist.” If the government carries this
51
burden, the alien is deportable. Normal methods of discretionary
relief from deportation, such as asylum, adjustment of status, or
52
53
registry, are not available. Either party, however, may appeal.
The court’s framework contains several procedural safeguards
for resident aliens who come before it. The court’s arbiters are Article
III judges; its hearings are open to the public; resident aliens have the
right to attend their own hearings, the right to counsel, and the right
to cross-examine nonsecret evidence; and if the resident aliens are
lawfully admitted for permanent U.S. residence, the aliens have the
right either to review secret evidence constructively through specially
appointed counsel or to receive an unclassified summary of the secret
54
evidence.
Nevertheless, the ATRC lacks several procedural safeguards.
ATRC proceedings begin against resident aliens before the aliens are
aware of the charges. At ATRC hearings, the government may enter
secret evidence against resident aliens that the aliens may not
personally review. In some situations, temporary or unlawful resident
aliens might not even receive an unclassified summary of that secret

46. See id. § 1534(e)(3)(E)(i) (“[I]f the alien involved is an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, the procedures described in subparagraph (F) [for constructively reviewing
secret evidence] shall apply.” (emphasis added)).
47. Id. § 1534(c)(2)–(3).
48. Id. § 1534(f).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 1534(g).
51. Even if an alien is ruled deportable, actual deportation is not automatic. The U.S.
government may retain custody of the alien until it finds another country that is willing to accept
the alien. Id. § 1537(b).
52. See id. § 1534(k) (forbidding the judge to consider relief from removal based on
asylum, withholding or cancellation of removal, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, or
registry).
53. Id. § 1535(c)(1).
54. A lawful, permanent resident alien also enjoys a right of automatic appeal upon denial
of a written summary of classified information. Id. § 1535(c)(2).
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evidence. These provisions implicate resident aliens’ Fifth
Amendment rights to procedural due process and have prompted
55
several commentators to argue that the ATRC is unconstitutional.
Throughout the ATRC’s statutory framework, Congress’s
purpose for the court is evident: to provide a forum through which
the U.S. attorney general may deport resident aliens who likely are
terrorists without requiring the attorney general to sacrifice any state
secrets in doing so.
II. ASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE ATRC’S SECRET-EVIDENCE PROVISIONS
As of this writing, no court has ever assessed whether the
ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions violate a resident alien’s right to
56
procedural due process. At a more general level, no court has ever
decided whether the government may use secret evidence before any
tribunal to find a resident alien deportable. Several courts have,
however, addressed secret evidence’s constitutionality in other
57
immigration settings. Arguing by analogy, it is possible to assess the
constitutionality of using secret evidence in deportation hearings
58
before the ATRC.
A. Secret Evidence, Immigration, and Resident Aliens’ Due Process
Rights
At the outset, it is important to note that a resident alien enjoys
the right to procedural due process. The Fifth Amendment protects
every person within the jurisdiction of the United States, whether that
person is a citizen, a lawful permanent resident, or a person “whose
59
presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory.” The

55. See infra Part II.B.
56. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 63–117 and accompanying text.
58. See infra Parts II.B, III.A.
59. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or [shall
any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”); Kwong
Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (“It is well established that if an alien is a lawful
permanent resident of the United States and remains physically present there, he is a person
within the protection of the Fifth Amendment. He may not be deprived of his life, liberty or
property without due process of law.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (“[O]nce an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested
with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within our borders.”).
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Fifth Amendment, however, does not protect every person to the
same extent:
The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens alike, are protected by
the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that
all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or,
indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be placed in a single
homogeneous legal classification. . . . [A] host of constitutional and
statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate distinction
between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for
one class not accorded to the other; and the class of aliens is itself a
heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of
60
ties to this country.

The strength of a resident alien’s procedural due process right is
commensurate with the strength of the alien’s ties to the United
States. As the U.S. Supreme Court has elaborated, “[m]ere lawful
presence in the country . . . gives [the resident alien] certain rights;
[those rights] become more extensive and secure when he makes
preliminary declaration of intention to become a citizen, and they
61
expand to those of full citizenship upon naturalization.”
A resident alien’s procedural due process rights are thus defined
along a sliding scale, increasing in potency with the alien’s growing
ties to the United States. An unlawful resident receives the least
protection under the Fifth Amendment; a lawful, temporary resident
receives more protection; and a lawful, permanent resident receives
the most extensive protection. Within this rubric, several courts have
assessed the constitutionality of using secret evidence against an alien
62
in an immigration proceeding. In all, courts have assessed the
constitutionality of secret evidence in five immigration contexts:
excluding an alien from entering the United States for the first time,
60. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 78–79; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“The
alien, to whom the United States has been traditionally hospitable, has been accorded a
generous and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our society.”).
61. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 770.
62. The ATRC is not the only apparatus that purports to allow the U.S. attorney general to
use secret evidence against a noncitizen in an immigration proceeding. Federal regulation allows
the attorney general to use secret evidence in a variety of immigration contexts. See 8 C.F.R. §
1240.11(c)(3)(iv) (2007) (permitting the use of classified information in applications for asylum
and withholding of removal in removal hearings); id. § 1240.33(c)(4) (permitting the use of
classified evidence in applications for asylum and withholding of deportation in exclusion
hearings); id. § 1240.11(a)(3) (permitting the use of classified information in adjustment of
status reports); id. § 1003.19(d) (permitting the use of classified information in custody and bond
determinations).
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excluding a resident alien from returning to the United States after
temporarily leaving, changing a resident alien’s legal status,
determining whether to set bond or to detain a resident alien awaiting
a deportation hearing, and determining whether to grant
discretionary relief from deportation after an alien has been held
deportable. This Part discusses courts’ treatment of each of these
contexts in turn.
1. Excluding an Alien from Entering the United States. Aliens
with few ties to the United States have experienced little success in
challenging the use of secret evidence. A leading case is United States
63
ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy. In ex rel. Knauff, a German-born
woman sought entry into the United States to become a naturalized
64
citizen. She had served England’s Royal Air Force “efficiently and
honorably” during World War II, had worked for the U.S. War
Department in Germany after the war, and had married a naturalized
U.S. citizen who had fought for the United States in World War II
65
and received an honorable discharge from the Army.
When Knauff arrived at Ellis Island, these facts were not enough
to secure her entry into the United States. Immigration and
Naturalization officers detained her, and the U.S. attorney general
“concluded upon the basis of confidential information that the public
interest required [her to] be denied the privilege of entry into the
66
United States.” The attorney general entered an order permanently
67
excluding her from the country. He also denied her a hearing on the
matter, finding that disclosure of the confidential information at such
68
a hearing “would be prejudicial to the public interest.”
The controversy made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
upheld the attorney general’s actions and ruled that the use of secret
evidence against Knauff was constitutional. As the Court reasoned,
69
admission to the United States is a privilege rather than a right.
Because initial entry into the United States is a mere privilege,

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
Id. at 539.
Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
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“[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process
70
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”
Ms. Knauff’s case generated much publicity, and the INS
71
eventually granted her a hearing despite the Court’s holding. There,
“it was discovered that the confidential informant was her husband’s
72
angry ex-girlfriend.” The Board of Immigration Appeals ultimately
held that there was insufficient evidence to support a decision to
73
exclude Ms. Knauff from the United States. Yet Knauff remains
good law: the attorney general may use secret evidence in
determining whether to admit or to exclude a noncitizen who wishes
74
to enter the United States for the first time.
2. Excluding a Resident Alien from Reentering the United States.
In contrast to a noncitizen wishing to enter the United States for the
first time, noncitizens who have entered the United States lawfully for
permanent residence develop a right to reenter the country if they
75
leave temporarily. At least one court has held that the government
76
may not use secret evidence to exclude them. In Rafeedie v. INS, a
lawful, permanent resident alien who had lived in the United States
77
for fourteen years left the country for two weeks. On the basis of
secret evidence, the U.S. attorney general sought to exclude him
78
when he attempted to reenter the country. The U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia struck down the use of secret evidence
because of the man’s strong ties to the United States and the risk that
using secret evidence would erroneously classify him as a risk to
70. Id. at 544.
71. Kopel & Olson, supra note 17, at 334; Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and
Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 933, 963 (1995).
72. Kopel & Olson, supra note 17, at 334 (citing ELLEN KNAUFF, THE ELLEN KNAUFF
STORY (1952)).
73. Weisselberg, supra note 71, at 963–64.
74. See Note, supra note 10, at 1968 (“Although both Knauff and Mezei ‘became—and
remain—causes célèbres highlighting the potential problems with using classified information,’
they nonetheless continue to carry significant weight with courts today.” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Kelley Brooke Snyder, Note, A Clash of Values: Classified Information in Immigration
Proceedings, 88 VA. L. REV. 447, 459 (2002))).
75. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to
our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional
status changes accordingly.”).
76. Rafeedie v. INS, 795 F. Supp. 13 (D.D.C. 1992) (mem.).
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at 16–17.
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79

national security. In striking down the government’s use of secret
evidence, the court applied the three-part balancing test for gauging
whether governmental action satisfies procedural due process, which
the U.S. Supreme Court developed in the 1976 case Mathews v.
80
Eldridge :
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
81
requirement would entail.

Under the Mathews test’s first prong, the court held that the
lawful, permanent resident alien “has a substantial stake that could be
affected by official action. ‘[T]he result, after all, may be to separate
him from family, friends, property, and career, and to remit him to
82
starting a new life in a new land.’” Under the test’s second prong,
relying on secret evidence posed a risk of error “weigh[ing] heavily”
83
against the government. Finally, under the test’s third prong, the
government’s interest in using secret evidence—protecting national
84
security—was significant but not all-encompassing. During the
exclusion proceedings, the government had allowed Rafeedie to stay
in the United States, even permitting him “to move from his home in
85
Ohio to Texas.” According to the court, this action suggested the
government had “at least implicitly determined that allowing plaintiff
to remain free in the United States pending resolution of this
litigation is in the public interest or, at the very least, not against the
86
public interest.” In light of these facts, the court held that Rafeedie’s
interest in remaining in the country coupled with the risk of error
posed by using secret evidence outweighed the government’s interest
79. Id. at 20.
80. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This test has become standard for
adjudicating procedural due process challenges. Courts and commentators commonly refer to
the test as the Mathews test, and this Note will do the same.
81. Id. at 335.
82. Rafeedie, 795 F. Supp. at 18 (alteration in original) (quoting Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d
506, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
83. Id. at 19.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 20.
86. Id.
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The court struck down the

3. Change-of-Status Determinations. In American-Arab Anti89
Discrimination Committee v. Reno, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit considered whether the U.S. attorney general could
use secret evidence against lawful, temporary resident aliens in a
90
change-of-status determination. The INS had initiated deportation
proceedings against eight resident aliens, alleging that they were
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
91
“a world-wide Communist organization.” The aliens challenged the
government’s basis for seeking to expel them, arguing that expelling
them for allegedly belonging to a Communist organization violated
92
the First Amendment. The attorney general subsequently dropped
that basis for deportation but replaced it by alleging that the aliens
93
belonged to an organization “involv[ed] in global terrorism.” The
government also charged six of the individuals for being temporary
94
residents who had overstayed their visas. This statement was true,
and two of the aliens who had overstayed their visas applied to
95
change their status to lawful, permanent residence. The government
denied their request for a change in status on the basis of secret
96
evidence. It justified its decision broadly, not naming any particular
grounds for suspecting the two resident aliens of wrongdoing other
97
than their alleged connection to the PFLP.

87. Id. at 19–20.
88. Id. at 20.
89. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated
on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
90. Id. at 1052. Among its other purposes, a change-of-status proceeding determines
whether a resident alien is considered an illegal resident, a legal temporary resident, or a legal
permanent resident. See Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255–58 (2006) (detailing
the ways in which the federal government may adjust or change a nonimmigrant’s status).
91. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 70 F.3d at 1053 (quoting Nomination of
William H. Webster to Be Director of Central Intelligence: Hearing Before the S. Select Comm.
of Intelligence, 100th Cong. 95 (1987) (statement of William Webster, Judge)).
92. Id. at 1052.
93. Id. at 1069.
94. Id. at 1053.
95. Id. at 1054.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1069.
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Applying the Mathews test, the court considered the aliens’
interest at issue in the change-of-status determination, the
government’s interest in using secret evidence at the hearing, and the
98
risk of erroneous deprivation that secret evidence might cause.
Without commenting why, but perhaps because deportation
proceedings against the individuals had begun, the court equated the
aliens’ interest in changing their status to lawful, permanent residence
99
with their right to remain in their homes. The court considered this
interest to be great: “Aliens who have resided for more than a decade
in this country, even those whose status is now unlawful because of
technical visa violations, have a strong liberty interest in remaining in
100
their homes.”
On the other hand, and crucial to the decision’s applicability in
other circumstances, the government’s interest in using secret
evidence was weak because
the Government has offered no evidence to demonstrate that these
particular aliens threaten the national security of this
country. . . . [A]lthough it indicates that the PFLP advocates
prohibited doctrines and that the aliens are members, it does not
indicate that either alien has personally advocated those doctrines or
101
has participated in terrorist activities.

Also, the court concluded that the risk of erroneous deprivation was
large: “There is no direct evidence in the record to show what
percentage of decisions utilizing undisclosed classified information
result in error; yet, as the district court below stated, ‘One would be
hard pressed to design a procedure more likely to result in erroneous
102
deprivations.’” The court invalidated the use of secret evidence,
writing, “Because of the danger of injustice when decisions lack the
procedural safeguards that form the core of constitutional due
process, the Mathews balancing suggests that use of undisclosed
information
in
adjudications
should
be
presumptively
unconstitutional. Only the most extraordinary circumstances could
103
support one-sided process.”
98. Id. at 1068–69.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1069–70 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 1069 (quoting Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 883 F. Supp. 1365,
1375 (C.D. Cal. 1995)).
103. Id. at 1070.
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104

4. Bond Determinations. In Kiareldeen v. Reno, the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey considered whether the
government could use secret evidence in determining whether to
detain or to release on bond a lawful, permanent resident alien
105
awaiting deportation proceedings. Applying the Mathews test, the
106
court struck down the use of secret evidence. As the court wrote,
the individual’s interests “must be accorded the utmost weight.
Kiareldeen has been removed from his community, his home, and his
family, and has been denied rights that ‘[rank] high among the
107
interests of the individual.’” It also stressed, “the risk of erroneous
deprivation . . . militates in the petitioner’s favor. Use of secret
evidence creates a one-sided process by which the protections of our
108
adversarial system are rendered impotent.” The government argued
that it satisfied the final Mathews factor because its desire to protect
national security constituted a strong governmental interest in using
109
secret evidence. As in Rafeedie, however, the government had
engaged in actions that undercut its claim that the particular resident
alien posed a serious threat. In the court’s words, “even the
government does not find its own allegations sufficiently serious to
commence
criminal
proceedings.
The
petitioner
asserts,
unchallenged, that the FBI recently closed its criminal investigation of
[him], and does not intend to reopen the investigation unless it
110
receives new information that he is involved in terrorist activity.”
Under these circumstances, the resident alien’s interest in remaining
free and the interest against an erroneous bond determination
111
outweighed the government’s interest in using secret evidence.

104. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001). The Third Circuit highlighted the limited
scope of its opinion: “We vigorously emphasize that the issue before us is solely the grant of
attorneys’ fees and costs. We are not reviewing the merits of the decisions in the administrative
proceedings or in the district court.” Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d at 547.
105. See Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 407–14 (examining the use of secret
evidence).
106. Id. at 414.
107. Id. at 413 (alteration in original).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 414.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 413–14 (holding that “the petitioner’s private interest in his physical liberty[]
must be accorded the utmost weight,” “the risk of erroneous deprivation[] also militates in the
petitioner’s favor,” and “the government’s claimed interest in detaining the petitioner cannot be
said to outweigh the petitioner’s interest in returning to freedom”).
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5. Considering Discretionary Relief from Deportation. In Jay v.
112
Boyd, the U.S. Supreme Court held 5–4 that the government may
use secret evidence to convince an administrative tribunal to refrain
from using its discretion to suspend the deportation of an alien
113
already found deportable. Explaining its decision, the Court agreed
with the district court’s determination “that the U.S. attorney general
may consider confidential information outside the record when
114
deciding whether to grant discretionary relief from deportation.”
Dissenting, Chief Justice Warren sharply criticized the
government’s reliance on secret evidence, even in an administrative
hearing for mere discretionary relief: “Such a hearing is not an
administrative hearing in the American sense of the term. It is no
115
hearing.” Justice Black, also dissenting, elaborated on this view:
What is meant by “confidential information”? According to officers
of the Immigration Service it may be “merely information we
received off the street”; or “what might be termed as hearsay
evidence, which could not be gotten into the record” . . . . No nation
can remain true to the ideal of liberty under law and at the same
time permit people to have their homes destroyed and their lives
blasted by the slurs of unseen and unsworn informers. There is no
possible way to contest the truthfulness of anonymous accusations.
The supposed accuser can neither be identified nor interrogated. He
may be the most worthless and irresponsible character in the
community. What he said may be wholly malicious, untrue,
unreliable, or inaccurately reported. In a court of law the triers of
fact could not even listen to such gossip, much less decide the most
116
trifling issue on it.
117

Despite this objection, Jay v. Boyd remains good law.
In short, courts have assessed the constitutionality of using secret
evidence in exclusion hearings, reentry proceedings, change-of-status
determinations, bond determinations, and discretionary relief
determinations. No court, however, has squarely addressed the

112. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345 (1956).
113. Id. at 347, 361.
114. Id. at 347 (alteration in original).
115. Id. at 361–62 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. at 365 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
117. See, e.g., Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 410–11 (D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that Jay v.
Boyd remains good law but was decided on statutory interpretation grounds).
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constitutionality of using secret evidence to rule a resident alien
deportable.
B. Assessing the ATRC’s Constitutionality by Analogy: Past
Commentators’ Thoughts
Several scholars have commented on the constitutionality of
118
using secret evidence in a deportation hearing. Most have done so
by applying the Mathews test, arguing by analogy from some or all of
the five circumstances relating to immigration in which courts have
119
assessed the constitutionality of secret evidence. Commentators
applying this test have largely agreed with federal courts’ application
of the three Mathews factors. First, a resident alien possesses an
interest in remaining in the United States; this interest militates
against allowing the use of evidence the alien cannot see or cross120
examine. Second, using secret evidence creates a risk of erroneously
depriving the resident alien of this interest to remain in the United
121
States. This risk also weighs against allowing the use of secret
122
evidence before the ATRC. Third, and cutting in the other
118. See, e.g., Kopel & Olson, supra note 17, at 331–35 (arguing that the ATRC’s secretevidence provisions are unconstitutional); Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 29–30 (arguing that the
ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions are constitutional); Beall, supra note 2, at 694 (arguing that
the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions are unconstitutional); Harkenrider, supra note 17, at
154–66 (same); Jim Rosenfeld, Note, Deportation Proceedings and the Due Process of Law, 26
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 742–49 (1995) (same); see also Melissa A. O’Loughlin, Note,
Terrorism: The Problem and the Solution—The Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of
1995, 22 J. LEGIS. 103, 120 (1996) (arguing that the Comprehensive Terrorism Prevention Act of
1995 “tramples the rights of law-abiding resident aliens” and “should not be adopted without
substantial revisions,” but stopping short of declaring that the Act would be unconstitutional).
In some circumstances, ATRC proceedings might also implicate a resident alien’s other
constitutional rights, such as the right to freedom of association. Such circumstances are beyond
the scope of this Note. For a helpful discussion of how the ATRC might implicate an alien’s
First Amendment rights, see Robert Plotkin, First Amendment Challenges to the Membership
and Advocacy Provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 10 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 623, 623–24, 643–53 (1996).
119. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 27–29; Beall, supra note 2, at 707–08; Harkenrider, supra
note 17, at 155–65; Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 744–48. But see Kopel & Olson, supra note 17,
at 331–35 (describing the ATRC as a “New Star Chamber” and arguing that its proceedings are
unconstitutional without reference to Mathews).
120. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 27, 29–30; Beall, supra note 2, at 707; Harkenrider, supra
note 17, at 155–58; Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 744–45.
121. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 27–29; Beall, supra note 2, at 707; Harkenrider, supra
note 17, at 158–61, 163–64; Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 745–46.
122. See Beall, supra note 2, at 707 (“The second factor (risk of error) is great, and the value
of additional procedural safeguards is obvious.”); Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 158–61, 163–64
(calling the lowered evidentiary standards the “most notorious features of the removal court
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direction, the government possesses an interest in using secret
evidence whenever disclosing the information would compromise
123
national security.
The commentators also are relatively unified in how they would
weigh each of the three Mathews factors. A resident alien’s interest in
124
125
remaining in the United States is “great,”
“weighty,”
126
127
“substantial,” or similarly defined. The risk of error from using
128
129
130
secret evidence is “great,” “grave,” or similarly stated. The
government’s interest in using secret evidence to protect national
131
security is more complex. In the abstract, this interest is “strong,”
132
133
“weighs heavy,” or is “tremendously important.” In practice,

provisions”); Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 746 (“[D]ue process history reveals the grave danger,
during times like these, of instituting procedures which fail to adequately protect due process
rights.”). But see Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 28–29 (arguing that even though using secret
evidence increases the risk of an erroneous deprivation, the ATRC’s other procedural
protections might overcome that risk).
123. See, e.g., Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 29 (“Without the ability to use classified
information as evidence in the deportation of terrorists, the executive branch is placed on the
horns of a most difficult dilemma . . . .”).
124. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 27 (“Her problem may be compounded by the scarlet
letter she has to bear. Having been adjudged a terrorist, she may be unable to gain admittance
to any other country, forcing her to take a place . . . as an indefinite guest at a governmental
detention facility.”).
125. Beall, supra note 2, at 707 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982)).
126. Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 156.
127. See Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 744 (“If the banishment of an alien from a country
into which he has been invited . . . where he may have formed the most tender of connections,
where he may have vested his entire property and acquired property . . . and where he may have
nearly completed his probationary title to citizenship . . . if a banishment of this sort be not a
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to
which the norms can be applied.” (alteration in original) (quoting JAMES MADISON, REPORT TO
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA (1800), reprinted in VA. COMM’N ON CONST’L GOV’T,
THE KENTUCKY-VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS AND MR. MADISON’S REPORT OF 1799, at 36 (1960)).
128. Beall, supra note 2, at 707.
129. Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 746.
130. See Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 28 (“[T]he risk of error is greater, maybe even much
greater, when a person is denied access to the full raw evidence against him, leaving him
incapable of testing the integrity of that evidence by cross-examination and rebuttal.”);
Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 160 (“Even if it is accepted that the singular purpose of
confrontation is to promote accuracy . . . the frail guarantee that the alien will be given a version
of events prepared by his opponent which is merely ‘sufficient to prepare a defense’ does little
to promote this process.” (footnote omitted)).
131. Beall, supra note 2, at 708.
132. Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 29; see also Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 165 (“This
government interest in secrecy should weigh heavily in the balance.”).
133. Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 747.
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however, “information does not always end up being as dangerous to
134
national security as originally presented.” For this reason, given the
“repeated, excessive deprivations of individual liberty that have been
executed in the name of ‘national security,’ healthy skepticism is
135
called for whenever this interest is invoked by legislators.”
Commentators’ analysis under the Mathews test also has differed
in several regards. Professor Michael Scaperlanda and Jennifer Beall
differ from other commentators in that they examine not only the
procedural safeguards that the ATRC lacks, but also those that it
136
adds compared to an administrative proceeding. Professor David
Martin is the first commentator to differentiate among different
classes of resident aliens based on the strength of their ties to the
137
United States. He also is the first commentator to examine whether
constructive review of secret evidence sufficiently protects the
138
procedural due process rights of lawful, permanent resident aliens.

134. Beall, supra note 2, at 708.
135. Rosenfeld, supra note 118, at 747; see also Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 164
(“National security is a unique concern, perhaps the most imperative of federal government
functions. . . . [T]he public view of this function often transmutes into a vital yet amorphous
stake against a faceless enemy. Guided only by a xenophobic national angst, this preoccupation
threatens the very nation it seeks to protect.”).
136. As Professor Scaperlanda explains, “[p]rocedural fairness derives from a flexible
aggregate of safeguards, which cannot accurately be viewed in isolation from each other.”
Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 33 n.62. Scaperlanda and Beall are not the first to argue from this
perspective. In 1975, Judge Friendly gave a lecture at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School in which he argued that “the elements of a fair hearing should not be considered
separately; if an agency chooses to go further than is constitutionally demanded with respect to
one item, this may afford good reason for diminishing or even eliminating another.” Henry J.
Friendly, Lecture, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975). Judge Friendly
named eleven procedural rights that indicate due process. In decreasing importance, they are an
individual’s rights to an unbiased tribunal, to notice of the proposed action and of the grounds
asserted for it, to an opportunity to present reasons against the proposed action, to call
witnesses, to know adverse evidence, to obtain a decision on the matter based solely on the
evidence presented, to counsel, to the making of a record, to a statement of reasons underlying
the tribunal’s decision, to public attendance of the hearing, and to judicial review. See id. at
1279–95 (discussing each factor).
137. See Martin, supra note 1, at 82–83, 136–37 (concluding that the Court “should recognize
that the line separating lawful permanent residents, domiciled with the clearest possible consent
from the community, from other aliens temporarily or unlawfully present carriers greater
significance” than the “exclusion-deportation line”).
138. See id. at 135–36. Professor Martin develops a five-category hierarchy of resident aliens,
depending on the strength of their ties to the United States and on the circumstances in which
the government seeks to deport them. See id. at 92–100 (describing a hierarchy of lawful
permanent residents, admitted nonimmigrants, entrants without inspection, parolees, and
applicants at the border). Noting that the ATRC has jurisdiction only over resident aliens—
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Professor Martin argues that constructive review is constitutionally
insufficient:
One can expect that [special attorneys] will be tough and
demanding, but the requirement that they not divulge any of the
classified information to their clients cannot help but impair their
effectiveness. To return to an earlier example, if the government’s
case turns critically on the informant’s testimony regarding meetings
with known terrorists in which the [lawful permanent resident]
allegedly participated, dogged cross-examination can try to expose
internal inconsistencies in the witness’s testimony. But it seems
nearly impossible for counsel to develop and present detailed
countertestimony without tipping his client as to the crucial dates at
issue—which could then compromise the secret information and
139
thus violate the terms of counsel’s role.

In the end, although Professor Martin describes the ATRC as “a
good-faith congressional effort to provide as many substitute
safeguards as possible while still shielding . . . confidential
140
information,” he argues that the court’s proceedings as applied to
141
lawful, permanent residents would be unconstitutional.
As these scholars demonstrate, although no court has squarely
addressed whether the government may constitutionally use secret
evidence to find a resident alien deportable, it is possible to gain
insight through arguments by analogy.

groups within his hierarchy that enjoy the greatest constitutional protections—he assesses the
court’s constitutionality as applied against lawful, permanent residents. Id. at 134.
139. Id. at 136.
140. Id. at 135.
141. See id. at 136 (“The ATRC is an impressive effort at substitute safeguards, but as
applied to [lawful permanent residents], it is just not good enough.”). All but one of the scholars
who have examined the ATRC’s constitutionality argue that its procedures violate a resident
alien’s right to procedural due process. Compare id. (arguing that the ATRC is
unconstitutional), with Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 28–30 (arguing that the ATRC is
constitutional). Perhaps importantly, Scaperlanda analyzed an early version of the bill creating
the ATRC that would have required the government ultimately to meet a burden of clear and
convincing evidence rather than a mere preponderance. See id. at 28 (“[T]he order of
deportability will only issue on a finding that the Attorney General met her burden by clear and
convincing evidence.”).
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III. REASSESSING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF THE ATRC’S SECRET-EVIDENCE PROVISIONS
A. Reassessing the ATRC’s Constitutionality
This Note’s analysis begins where other commentators’ analyses
end. Like the previous analysis, this Part analyzes the ATRC’s
constitutionality under the Mathews test. It does not, however,
belabor the direction in which each factor leans: Resident aliens,
whether permanent and whether lawful, possess an interest against
142
being deported from the United States. Using secret evidence poses
143
a risk of deporting a resident alien erroneously. The government
possesses an interest in preventing the disclosure of sensitive
144
information and in preventing domestic acts of terrorism.
Instead, this Part focuses on each factor’s magnitude. Because
the Mathews test is a balancing test, the magnitude of each factor is
just as important as its direction. Evaluating the magnitude of each
factor shows that although aliens who possess different legal statuses
enjoy different levels of constitutional protection, the ATRC risks a
successful as-applied challenge from unlawful residents or legal
temporary residents because the court provides them with weaker
145
procedural protections than it provides legal permanent aliens. The
ATRC also risks a successful as-applied challenge insofar as it allows
deportation proceedings to continue without providing an alien with a
146
special attorney to review secret evidence on the alien’s behalf.
Exposing the ATRC to these constitutional uncertainties is
unnecessary because the government’s interest in deporting a
suspected alien terrorist presumably is just as great when the alien is
an illegal or legal temporary resident as it is when the alien happens
147
to enjoy the legal, permanent resident status.
1. Reassessing the Magnitude of a Resident Alien’s Interest
Against Being Deported. As the U.S. Supreme Court has held, a
lawful, permanent resident possesses a strong interest against being

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See supra notes 82, 98–100, 107, 120, 124–27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83, 102–08, 121–22, 128–30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 84–86, 101, 109–10, 123, 131–35 and accompanying text.
See infra Part III.B.1.
See infra Part III.B.2.
See infra Part III.B.1.
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148

deported. As discussed in Part II, however, the interest of an
unlawful or temporary resident is less clear-cut. The federal judiciary
has adjudicated only one case, American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee v. Reno, involving a temporary resident’s rights against the
149
government’s use of secret evidence in an immigration proceeding.
Without commenting why, though perhaps because the aliens who
brought the challenge were facing pending deportation proceedings,
the court equated the aliens’ right to a change in status with their
150
right to remain in their homes. Because each resident alien had
resided in the country for over a decade, the court described this
151
interest as “strong.” To support this statement, the court cited a
U.S. Supreme Court case involving a lawful, permanent resident
152
alien; the court, however, stopped short of directly equating the
strength of temporary residents’ right to remain in their homes with
153
the strength of the corresponding right of permanent residents. The
court ultimately held that, because of the strength of the aliens’ right
to remain in their homes, the government could not use secret
evidence
in
the
temporary
residents’
change-of-status
154
determinations.
As American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee suggests,
unlawful or temporary residents may need to substantiate the
strength of their interests against being deported, whereas a court will
presume the strength of this interest for lawful, permanent residents.
Resident aliens thus should not be treated as a homogenous group
when assessing the ATRC’s constitutionality; aliens’ “sliding scale” of
155
constitutional protection survives.
An unlawful or temporary

148. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (“[O]nce an alien gains admission to
our country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional
status changes accordingly.”).
149. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated
on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
150. See id. at 1068–69 (“Aliens who have resided for more than a decade in this country,
even those whose status is now unlawful because of technical visa violations, have a strong
liberty interest in remaining in their homes.”).
151. Id. at 1068–69.
152. Id. (citing Landon, 459 U.S. at 34 (holding that a lawful, permanent resident who leaves
the country for a short time is entitled to due process if the government denies reentry)).
153. See id. at 1069 (accepting the premise only that “the ‘equities’ of long residence in the
country are relevant to legalization” (citing Firestone v. Howerton, 671 F.2d 317, 321 n.10
(1982))).
154. Id. at 1070.
155. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text.
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resident alien, however, might in some situations be able to prove an
interest against deportation similar in magnitude to that of a lawful,
156
permanent resident. In such a situation, a court might hold ATRC
proceedings to be unconstitutional as applied against an unlawful or
temporary resident alien.
2. Reassessing the Risk of Error. As courts and commentators
have made clear, allowing the government to rely on secret evidence
in deportation proceedings increases the risk of error. Relying on
secret evidence, however, might increase the risk of error differently
in differing circumstances. The magnitude by which secret evidence
increases the risk of error depends on at least three factors: whether
the resident alien receives a summary of the government’s secret
evidence; the extent to which that summary accurately and precisely
describes the evidence; and, in circumstances in which the
government cannot provide a summary of secret evidence, whether
the resident alien receives a special attorney to observe and crossexamine the actual evidence on the alien’s behalf.
The reason that secret evidence risks error is simple: because the
resident alien may not observe the evidence, the alien cannot test its
157
veracity. As commentators have discussed, providing a resident
alien with an unclassified summary of the evidence abates this
concern, at least to the extent that the summary accurately and
158
precisely describes the actual evidence.
Unfortunately, it is
unrealistic to expect the government’s summary to be accurate and
precise. To the extent such a summary were accurate and precise, it
would run the risk of tipping off a resident alien to the government’s
actual confidential information as well as to that information’s source.
For the summary procedure to have been invoked, an Article III
judge already would have ruled that alerting the resident alien to this
information “would likely cause serious and irreparable harm to the

156. See supra notes 150–51 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 9, at 49 (“Lacking cross-examination, aliens may face
biases or inaccurate evidence without the chance to expose these weaknesses to the fact
finder.”). Jackson also argues that secret evidence produces a risk of erroneous deportation
because it “disables aliens from explaining the substance and context of the evidence to the fact
finder.” Id. A special attorney would be able both to cross-examine the evidence and to explain
its substance and context on behalf of the alien to the fact finder.
158. See, e.g., Scaperlanda, supra note 11, at 28 (noting that such a summary “enhances—
albeit imperfectly—the ability of the alien to defend herself”).
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national security or death or serious bodily injury to any person.”
The U.S. attorney general also already would have demonstrated
160
probable cause to believe that the resident alien is a terrorist. Under
these circumstances, the attorney general and the judge would share a
strong incentive to err on the side of providing the alien with an
161
unclassified summary that is inaccurate or imprecise. It is therefore
unrealistic to expect that an unclassified summary of the
government’s secret evidence will do much to reduce the risk of error.
Even assuming that the government’s unclassified summary
would be accurate and precise, substituting the summary for actual
evidence still would pose constitutional problems because it would
increase the risk of erroneous deportation. Resident aliens receiving
such a summary would still not be able to observe or cross-examine
162
the actual evidence against them.
No matter how well this
unclassified summary were to describe the evidence, the aliens would
only imperfectly learn the nature of the actual evidence against them.
The aliens thus would be only imperfectly able to challenge its
veracity and to build a defense. To the extent that the resident aliens’
ability to challenge the veracity of evidence against them and to plan
a defense grows weaker, the risk of erroneous deprivation—and the
risk of a successful as-applied constitutional challenge—
163
correspondingly grows stronger.
In some circumstances, providing an unclassified summary of
secret evidence might jeopardize national security. In these
circumstances, the statute allows the government to conduct ATRC

159. 8 U.S.C. § 1534(e)(3)(D)(iii)(I) (2006).
160. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
161. Congress has followed the same impulse. Although the ATRC requires an unclassified
summary to be “sufficient to enable the alien to prepare a defense,” an early version of the bill
ultimately creating the ATRC would have given this standard more teeth; it would have
required such a summary “to provide the alien with substantially the same ability to make his
defense as would disclosure of the classified information.” Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 150 &
n.40 (quoting S. 735, 104th Cong., § 503(e)(6)(B) (1995), as reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S7857,
S7862 (daily ed. June 7, 1995)). Congress thus considered, but shied away from, a standard that
would have required the government’s unclassified summary to more closely track its actual
secret evidence.
162. Cf. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 418 (D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that being “denied the
opportunity to meaningfully cross-examine one person . . . unconstitutional damages [a party’s]
due process right to confront his accusers”).
163. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
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164

proceedings without providing such a summary. If the resident alien
before the ATRC enjoys the status of lawful and permanent resident,
the alien may request a special attorney to observe and cross-examine
165
the actual secret evidence on his behalf. Exercising this option
lessens the risk of erroneous deportation enough, this Note argues, to
shield ATRC proceedings from successful as-applied procedural due
process challenges.
Here, this Note parts ways with Professor Martin, who worries
that a special attorney’s duty not to disclose the government’s secret
166
evidence might cause the attorney to be ineffective. The attorney
would need to protect against tipping off the alien to the
government’s secret evidence, Professor Martin argues, limiting the
attorney not only in what to tell the alien, but also in what to ask. Due
to these limitations, he concludes the special attorney might not be
able to prepare an adequate defense.
Professor Martin’s concern is valid, but not fatal to the special
attorney’s effectiveness. It is true that a special attorney might need
to formulate questions carefully to the resident alien to avoid tipping
off the alien to confidential information. Unlike the attorney general
and unlike the ATRC’s presiding judge, however, a resident alien’s
167
special attorney would owe the alien a fiduciary duty. Thus, the
special attorney alone could be trusted to formulate questions to the
168
alien with the alien’s best interests in mind. To the extent that
formulating questions too cautiously might curtail the attorney’s
effectiveness, the attorney therefore could be trusted to minimize any
169
adverse effect. A forward-looking attorney also could circumvent

164. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying note 139.
167. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007) (“A lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence . . . in representing a client.”); id. cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must . . . act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client’s behalf.”).
168. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
169. A special attorney would have reason to be cautious in phrasing questions so as to
avoid leaking information to the resident alien: “[a] special attorney receiving classified
information . . . who discloses such information [to the alien] shall be subject to a fine . . .
imprisoned for not less than 10 years nor more than 25 years, or both.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1534(e)(3)(F)(ii)(II) (2006). Still, as the Model Rules of Professional Conduct instruct, a
lawyer should “take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s
cause or endeavor.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (2007). The special
attorney’s obligation thus helps to ameliorate the danger that fear of criminal prosecution would
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any potential problem by comprehensively interviewing the alien
before reviewing the government’s secret evidence. To be sure,
conducting such an interview would be cumbersome; without
knowing the specific events against which the attorney would need to
defend the alien, the special attorney would be well advised to elicit
all information that could possibly be relevant. Once apprised of this
information, however, the special attorney would be in a position to
represent the alien effectively after observing and cross-examining
the government’s secret evidence. The attorney would be sufficiently
able to prepare a defense; the only remaining question would be
whether the attorney’s ability to observe and cross-examine the secret
evidence sufficiently reduces the risk of erroneous deportation.
The answer to this question is yes. To a special attorney, the
evidence is not secret; the attorney possesses a security clearance
170
allowing access to classified material. The resident alien enjoys an
attorney-client relationship with that attorney; the special attorney is
171
under a fiduciary duty to act in the alien’s best interests. Although
the resident alien does not view the secret evidence personally, for
the purposes of cross-examining the evidence the alien may fairly be
said to view it constructively through the eyes of the special
172
attorney. Thus, in this situation, the ATRC’s secret-evidence
provisions pass constitutional muster.
The secret-evidence provisions might not pass constitutional
muster, however, in circumstances when an unlawful or temporary
resident alien receives no summary of evidence. In that situation, the
173
resident alien receives no special attorney to review the evidence.
Accordingly, the alien faces the same risk of error as Boyd and
Rafeedie. Just as in Jay v. Boyd and Rafeedie, the resident alien might
prevail in a due process claim.

cause the attorney to tiptoe too softly when questioning the alien, which might detract from the
effectiveness of representation.
170. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 167–69 and accompanying text.
172. Allowing an attorney to review confidential evidence on behalf of a client is a common
enough practice that the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct address the situation. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 7 (2007) (“Rules or court orders governing
litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client.
Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.”).
173. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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3. Reassessing the Magnitude of the Government’s Interest. As
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Rafeedie, and
Kiareldeen counsel, the government may not voice its interest in using
174
secret evidence in abstract terms. Rather, its relevant interest must
be specific and fact based—the extent to which that particular
resident alien would endanger national security if left at large within
U.S. borders or the extent to which disclosing the government’s
particular sensitive information about the alien would prejudice
175
national security or put any individual at substantial risk of harm.
When gauging the constitutionality of ATRC proceedings
against a particular individual, the totality of the government’s
interactions with that individual conceivably could cut in either
direction. As in Rafeedie and Kiareldeen, the government may
undermine its argument that the resident alien is dangerous by
treating the alien outside of the proceedings as though not
176
dangerous. Conversely, it is conceivable that the government could
strengthen its argument that the resident alien is a terrorist by
treating the alien cautiously in all interactions.
The government might argue that the applicability of AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee and Kiareldeen to ATRC
proceedings is questionable. For ATRC proceedings even to
commence, the U.S. attorney general must prove to the ATRC judge
that the government possesses, at a minimum, probable cause to
177
believe that the resident alien in question is a terrorist. Probable
cause is not an inconsequential standard, and nothing in AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee or Kiareldeen suggests that the
government’s level of suspicion approached that standard in those
cases. In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the
government alleged broadly that the resident aliens in question were
178
connected to a terrorist organization.
It did not allege any
wrongdoing or plans of wrongdoing by either resident alien. In
Kiareldeen, the government’s information against the resident alien

174. See, e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069 (9th Cir.
1995), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that a “broad generalization
regarding a distant foreign policy concern and a related national security threat” was not
adequate to justify the “use of undisclosed information”).
175. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 84–86, 109–10 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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consisted of one piece of uncorroborated hearsay, and Kiareldeen
believed the source of the information was a person who had
179
instigated his arrest on false charges six times. To the extent that
neither factual situation reaches probable cause, American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee and Kiareldeen would seem
inapposite to a challenge against the ATRC. Because the government
must possess probable cause to use the ATRC, its interest in
deporting a resident alien successfully brought before that court
might be stronger than its corresponding interest in either AmericanArab Anti-Discrimination Committee or Kiareldeen.
Weighing in the final balance, a resident alien’s interest in
remaining in the United States can be strong no matter what legal
180
status the resident alien enjoys. The risk of erroneous deprivation
posed by secret evidence varies, depending on whether the resident
alien receives a summary of the secret evidence, the extent to which
that summary accurately and precisely describes the evidence, and—
in circumstances in which the government cannot provide a summary
of secret evidence—whether the resident alien receives a special
attorney to observe and cross-examine the actual evidence on the
181
alien’s behalf. The government’s interest in deporting a resident
alien who the attorney general reasonably suspects to be a terrorist is
strong—perhaps stronger than the government’s interest to deport
the aliens at issue in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
and Kiareldeen. Because of the variation in the magnitude of each
interest, it is conceivable that the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions
might be unconstitutional as applied in some circumstances. For
ATRC proceedings to be constitutional in all situations, a few of the
court’s statutory provisions must be amended.
B. Remedying the ATRC’s Constitutional Deficiencies
1. Treat Unlawful and Temporary Resident Aliens the Same as
Lawful, Permanent Resident Aliens. The government’s interest in
detaining or deporting a terrorist who is unlawfully residing, or
lawfully but temporarily residing, in the United States is presumably
equal to the government’s interest in detaining or deporting a

179. Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402, 413, 416–17 (D.N.J. 1999), rev’d on other
grounds sub. nom. Kiareldeen v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001).
180. See supra notes 148, 150–51 and accompanying text.
181. See supra Part III.A.2.
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terrorist who happens to enjoy the status of a lawful, permanent
182
resident. Because the constitutional interests of an unlawful or
temporary resident alien may in some cases rival those of a lawful,
183
permanent resident,
Congress should eliminate the statutory
provisions in the ATRC’s framework that distinguish between the
groups. Otherwise, Congress risks having ATRC proceedings against
temporary resident or unlawful resident alien terrorists invalidated as
184
unconstitutional.
2. Appoint a Special Attorney in Every ATRC Proceeding, and
Allow the Attorney to Review the Government’s Secret Evidence. The
ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions run the greatest risk of violating a
resident alien’s constitutional rights when the government uses secret
185
evidence without appointing a special attorney. In such a situation,
even if the alien were to receive an unclassified summary of the
government’s secret evidence, the alien would be able to challenge
186
the veracity of the evidence only imperfectly. Appointing a special
attorney to each resident alien who comes before the ATRC would
allay this constitutional concern because each resident alien could
review and challenge the government’s secret evidence constructively
187
through a special attorney.
Appointing a special attorney in every ATRC proceeding would
burden the government. Short of banning secret evidence, however,
allowing a special attorney to observe and cross-examine secret
evidence is the surest way to eliminate the risk that using such
evidence would cause an erroneous deportation. To the government’s
benefit, appointing special counsel in all ATRC proceedings would
ensure that the U.S. attorney general could prosecute a deportation
proceeding against an individual who the attorney general has
probable cause to believe is a terrorist without needing to publicly
disclose a state secret. Without such changes, however, the ATRC
risks being held unconstitutional.

182. Cf., e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1069–70 (9th
Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (drawing no line between temporary
and permanent residents when considering the government’s interest in deportation).
183. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
185. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
186. For a discussion of this, see supra notes 161, 165 and accompanying text.
187. For a discussion of this, see supra Part III.A.2.
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CONCLUSION
The ATRC’s statutory framework has several constitutional
deficiencies. The court’s framework, however, which allows for the
use of secret evidence, does not need a significant overhaul to remedy
these concerns. For the use of secret evidence during ATRC
proceedings to become constitutional in all cases, the ATRC’s
statutory framework must guarantee temporary resident aliens and
unlawful resident aliens the same protections it provides legal,
permanent resident aliens; and the ATRC’s framework must either
stipulate that every resident alien receive a special attorney who can
review and cross-examine the government’s secret evidence or else
ban the use of such evidence.
These two suggestions for reform are not meant to exhaust what
the government could, or even should, do to improve ATRC
188
proceedings. Rather, they are meant to describe only what the
government must do, at a minimum, for the ATRC’s statutory
framework allowing for the use of secret evidence to comply in all
circumstances with resident aliens’ constitutional right to procedural
due process. The ATRC cannot ensure compliance in all
circumstances with resident aliens’ constitutional right to procedural
due process unless it does two things: provide illegal resident aliens
and legal, temporary resident aliens with the same procedural
protections that it provides legal, permanent resident aliens; and
appoint a special attorney to every alien who comes before the court
to review secret evidence on the alien’s behalf. Without these
changes, the ATRC’s secret-evidence provisions could be found
unconstitutional.

188. Several calls for reform deserve discussion. Lawrence Harkenrider, for example,
recommends raising the government’s burden of proof to deport a resident alien from a mere
preponderance to clear and convincing evidence. Harkenrider, supra note 17, at 166. Jennifer
Beall suggests that the ATRC’s framework should be amended to foreclose the use of evidence
that is illegally obtained. See Beall, supra note 2, at 707 (“[D]eport[ation] based on illegally
obtained . . . evidence . . . violat[es] a fundamental element of due process, the right to
confrontation.”).

